Adams, Charles

From: Subject: Adams, Charles Date: Wed, 2 Oct 2002 00:09:37 +1200 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Location: http://www.calvin.edu/fss/125conf/adamsch.htm X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1106 Adams, Charles

Christian Scholarship . . . for = What?

An International, Interdisciplinary Conference =

September 27-29, 2001

Session: = Christian=20 Scholarship and Technology

The = Unity in=20 Creation and the Bi-directional Character of Technological=20 Artifacts
Charles C. Adams
Dean of the Natural Sciences, Dordt College

PAPER=20 ABSTRACT:

     Two characteristic=20 presuppositions of Christian scholarship are the unity and = non-self-sufficiency=20 of creation. These function in stark contrast to the Cartesian notions = of=20 autonomous and dichotomous substance-res cogitans and res = extensa.=20 The latter lead to the naturalistic reduction of the properties by which = we=20 describe creatures to those described by physics alone. The former, on = the other=20 hand, appreciate the diversity of properties by which we recognize the = identity=20 of creatures and by which they are distinguished from one=20 another.
     In this paper it is first = shown that=20 recognition of creation's unity in diversity entails a rejection of the=20 natural/artificial classification scheme by which, for example, living = things=20 are viewed in polar opposition to technological artifacts. It is then = argued=20 that monadic (spatial, physical, etc.) and relational (economic, = aesthetic,=20 moral, etc.) properties are characteristic of and inherent in all = creatures:=20 those found "in nature" as well as those originating in technological = activity.=20 Finally, it is argued that there is a bi-directional character to the=20 relationship between human beings and technological artifacts: human = beings=20 design relational properties into artifacts; artifacts guide human = beings to=20 behave in accordance with those same=20 properties.
     The practical implication = of this=20 bi-directionality is that technological innovation not only builds upon, = but=20 also directs itself. Thus, once a technological direction gains foothold = in a=20 culture, it gathers social momentum and something akin to a revolution = is needed=20 to change that direction. Moving a culture, for example, from dependence = on the=20 family automobile to dependence on mass transportation requires a = profound and=20 culture disturbing paradigm = shift.
     Disciplined=20 reflection will be required increasingly in the 21st century to solve = problems=20 in transportation, communication, and energy use-just to mention = three-brought=20 about by uncritical technological innovation that has occurred in the = 20th=20 century. Christian scholarship already has the presuppositions and the=20 philosophical tools needed to effectively initiate that disciplined=20 reflection.

PART I: THE UNITY IN THE DIVERSITY OF=20 CREATION

     The word "sovereignty" = holds an=20 important place in the lexicon of Christian thought. It helps our = finite,=20 creaturely minds to form a partial picture of the character of our = Creator-or=20 better, to hear and more clearly understand the story by which our = Creator=20 reveals himself to us. In one sense it reiterates Paul's words in the = first=20 chapter of his letter to the Colossians1 where he = describes=20 Christ-the Word of God-as the Creator of "all things." In a somewhat = different=20 sense it expresses succinctly those words of Abraham Kuyper, who said, = "...no=20 single piece of our mental world is to be hermetically sealed off from = the rest,=20 and there is not a square inch in the whole domain of our human = existence over=20 which Christ, who is Sovereign over all, does not cry: 'Mine!'"2 Conversely, the word "sovereign" implies at least two = rather=20 important characteristics of the creation as well. When Paul tells us = that=20 Christ did not only create all things but that all things were created=20 for him, that he is "before all things," and that "in him all = things hold=20 together,"3 he is telling us that all things are unified in = relation to=20 the Creator. Moreover, to stress, as Paul does, that all things are = created by=20 Christ is to make very clear that there is nothing uncreated, = autonomous, or=20 self-sufficient. Thus our understanding of the sovereignty of God = entails that=20 creation is both unified and non-self-sufficient in its=20 creatureliness. The unity in creation derives from its dependent = nature.=20 As such, the essential, core meaning of everything that has existence is = to=20 reference its sovereign Creator, both as its origin and its telos, and = as the=20 source of its temporal sustenance. The non-self-sufficiency of = creation=20 is entailed by the absolute sovereignty of the Creator. That "absolute=20 sovereignty" describes-paradoxical as it may seem to our finite, = creaturely=20 minds-exclusively uncreated and self-sufficient being. And that = exclusivity=20 entails the creaturely, non-self-sufficiency of all other=20 being.
     These two characteristics of = creation,=20 so central to a Christian worldview, contrast starkly with the = characteristics=20 of creation central to the modernist or Cartesian worldview. Descartes = saw=20 creation as composed of essentially two substances: what he called = res=20 cogitans, thinking substance, and res extensa, extended = substance.4 In=20 today's language-the language of the typical high school science = classroom-we=20 would say mind and matter. And in that modernist worldview, substance is = uncreated and self-sufficient. For example, the basic laws of logic and = of=20 mathematics-part of thinking substance-are laws for God as = well as=20 for the rest of us. And the basic physical "stuff" that constitutes the=20 universe-that which Einstein described as being able to take the form of = matter=20 or energy-every school child memorizes as "neither created nor = destroyed, but=20 only changed from one form to another."
One consequence of the = modernist=20 worldview is the tendency to reduce things to the category of either = "pure mind"=20 or "pure matter." The expression, "it's all in your mind," is an example = of=20 this. Likewise, when we talk about the properties of rock, a flower, a = star, or=20 an artifact like the automobile, we think almost exclusively about = physical=20 properties. Living things are reduced to non-living phenomena when = biological=20 characteristics are explained in terms of biochemistry. And biochemistry = is, of=20 course, a branch of chemistry, which, one might argue, is a branch of = physics.=20 Even such human phenomena as feelings of anxiety, technological = development,=20 artistic expression, and the presence of organized religion throughout = history=20 are explained in terms of evolutionary change. And evolutionary change = is=20 explained by alterations in DNA, i.e., biochemical change-which gets us = back to=20 physics. This putative process of reductionism, whereby the laws of = physics=20 can-at least potentially-explain everything, is the unifying principle = in the=20 worldview commonly known as naturalism. The laws of physics = ultimately=20 explain even the Cartesian category of "thinking=20 substance"-mind.
     My point thus far is = that the=20 concept of the sovereignty of God stands in radical opposition to = naturalism.=20 And when the unity in creation is found in creation's dependence on its = Creator=20 rather than in the laws of physics, then reductionism is no longer = possible or=20 desirable, and an irreducible diversity in creation can be = appreciated.
Let=20 me say that again, very simply: The sovereignty of God entails the unity = in=20 creation, and that God-centered unity provides the ground for an = appreciation of=20 an irreducible diversity in creation.

PART II: THE PROPERTIES OF=20 CREATURES

     Consider some of the = implications=20 of asserting that there is a fundamental diversity in creation, an=20 irreducibility such that creation cannot be reduced to one of its = aspects, and=20 that the unity in that diversity can be found transcending creation, in = Jesus=20 Christ, its Creator, Sustainer, and Redeemer. It is fairly obvious that = the=20 diversity in creation is not simply a diversity of individual things, = but that=20 each created thing also has a diversity of properties. Moreover, = locating the=20 unity of creation outside of creation suggests that there is a kind of=20 ontological egalitarianism among the properties of any created thing. = Thus, for=20 example, the spatial extension of a thing-i.e., its volume-is no less = real a=20 property than its mass.
     Now this next = step in=20 my argument is very important. Having rejected the notions of autonomous = substance and ontological dualism (mind and matter), any grounds for a = radical=20 dualism in the properties of things are also removed. Thus, we might = expect to=20 find a multiplicity of irreducible properties among all created things. = And,=20 perhaps more importantly, we should not expect to find any kinds of = property to=20 be "more real" than any other kinds. More specifically, in place of the = radical=20 Cartesian dualism of physical and mental properties, we might very well = be able=20 to identify a finite number of properties for any created thing. = Likewise, in=20 place of the ontological hierarchy of naturalism whereby physical = properties are=20 more real than mental properties, we should observe the properties of = any=20 created thing to be equally real.
     A = simple=20 example is appropriate at this point. The quills on a porcupine serve to = protect=20 the porcupine, to some extent, from predators. One might describe those = quills=20 in terms, for example, of number, length, mass, sharpness, compressive = and=20 bending strength, and elasticity. All of these are commonly 5=20 categorized as "physical properties." But it is obvious that those = quills=20 function in the life of the porcupine to preserve that life. That is, = the quills=20 function biotically, having the biotic property of preservation. = It is=20 also obvious that those quills achieve this property of preservation by=20 inflicting pain on a potential predator. That is to say, the quills = function=20 sensitively in the life of a potential predator, having the property of = being=20 painful. My thesis thus far would argue that the biotic and sensitive = properties=20 of the quills are not reducible to and are just as real as the quills' = physical=20 properties.
     One might argue that I am = confusing=20 two very different categories of properties: monadic and relational. = While I=20 concede that there may be some validity in making that distinction, it = is too=20 often understood as being absolute. For example, the mass of a quill is = seen as=20 a monadic property, inherent in the quill. The painfulness of the = quill=20 is seen as a relational property, existing only in relation to creatures = with=20 sensation. Where this argument fails is in not realizing that the mass = of the=20 quill is a property that exists only in relation to creatures with = mass.=20 But a physical reductionist would not see this because, for such a = person and by=20 definition, all real creatures have mass.6

PART III: THE CREATURELINESS OF TECHNOLOGICAL=20 ARTIFACTS

     There is a sense, = however, in=20 which the distinction between monadic and relational properties might be = useful.=20 Consider that those porcupine quills in my example may be gathered by = some=20 entrepreneur, packaged, and sold in a novelty store. Encountering the = package of=20 porcupine quills in the store window, you will also notice the price = tag. Those=20 quills now have the property of cost, or monetary value. Cost, an = economic=20 property, exists only in relation to human beings and only after one or = more=20 human beings have acted in relation with a thing (the porcupine quills) = in such=20 a way that its status as a commodity emerges. More generally, one might = say that=20 human actions, in relation with things, "open up" or actualizes a range = of=20 properties that exist only in potential prior to those human actions. = Thus, one=20 might think of monadic properties as those properties of a non-human = creature=20 that exist in relation to other non-human creatures, and prior to any = human=20 interaction. Relational properties are then those that exist in relation = to=20 human beings during and after a non-human creature has been acted upon = by a=20 human.
     This distinction is most useful = in=20 clarifying the nature of technological artifacts. For the purpose of = this paper=20 I will define a technological artifact as any object that results from = an=20 interaction between human beings and a non-human creature whereby the = non-human=20 creature is intentionally formed in some way. Simply put, technological=20 artifacts are the products of technology. The distinction between = monadic and=20 relational properties allows us to disclose, critique, and replace the=20 problematic distinction between "natural" and "artificial"=20 things.
     The prevailing distinction = between=20 natural and artificial is, at least in part, rooted in the dualistic and = reductionistic view of creation as mind and matter. What is "natural" is = that=20 which is based on matter and essentially unformed (or untransformed) in = any way=20 by mind. What is artificial is that which was once natural but has since = been=20 formed (or transformed) in some novel way by mind. The current = pejorative=20 connotation to that which is artificial owes to recent anti-technology=20 sentiments. These have been in reaction to, for example, the nuclear = threats of=20 the 1950s, the various environmental crises of the 1960s and 1970s, and = the=20 proliferation and hegemonic influence of information technology at the = turn of=20 the century. But anti-technology is not new, and promotion of that which = is=20 "natural" over that which is "artificial" can easily be found in 19th = century=20 romantic literature. Consider, for example, these lines from=20 Wordsworth:
         &nbs= p;     Sweet=20 is the lore which Nature=20 brings:
          &n= bsp;    Our=20 meddling=20 intellect
          =      Mis-shapes=20 the beauteous forms of=20 things:-
          &= nbsp;    We=20 murder to dissect. 7
The problem with such a distinction between natural and = artificial is that it fails to respect the unity in creation as well as = the=20 creatureliness of humanity. Distinguishing between monadic and = relational=20 properties, on the other hand, respects creation's unity and clarifies = the role=20 of humanity in actualizing properties of=20 things.
     Getting back to technological=20 artifacts, one might argue with the prevailing view that they are = "artificial"=20 (as opposed to "natural") by suggesting that since they emerge from the = natural=20 behavior of ordinary creatures (human beings), they cannot be any less = "natural"=20 than the dams of beavers, the hives of bees, an oak tree in a western = forest, or=20 the early morning sunrise. Such an argument, while valid, is less than=20 satisfactory because it does not account for the intuitively obvious = differences=20 between those creatures in the above list and the creatures we refer to = as=20 technological artifacts. That difference, I reiterate, is that the = latter are=20 creatures that have undergone forming or transforming by human beings = and have=20 been opened up to have a number of relational properties actualized. For = example, one particular oak tree may have been harvested, processed into = lumber,=20 and shipped to the local lumberyard where I purchase it in the form of = 1x6=20 lumber. From there I bring it to my woodworking shop, cut it, glue it = up, stain=20 it, varnish it, and assemble it into bookshelves for my library. When = complete,=20 the oak serves the very practical function-in large part due to its = hardness and=20 bending strength-of supporting and displaying a row of my books. I will = argue=20 that all this is very natural. The wood-which was once part of a living = oak=20 tree-has had a number of relational properties actualized. While its = physical=20 properties remain important, it now has sensory and symbolic properties = (it=20 enables me to perceive where different books of mine can be=20 found), economic properties (I had to pay for it), aesthetic=20 properties (it has a finished beauty that harmonizes with the = rest of my=20 library), and social properties (it facilitates interaction with my = academic=20 associates by making books available at my=20 fingertips).
     One other point needs to = be=20 stressed here. Those relational properties that emerge in the process of = technological forming do not do so arbitrarily. They are consciously or=20 unconsciously designed into the artifact. They depend on a = substratum of=20 monadic properties for their particular manifestation, but they are not=20 identical with or reducible to those monadic properties.
To = summarize:=20 Technological artifacts are things that result from the actions of = humans as=20 they give form to (or transform) other things in creation. The resulting = artifacts have distinct and new relational properties that emerge during = the=20 formation (or transformation) process. Those relational properties are a = function of the monadic properties of the things that have been formed=20 (transformed) as well as a function of the process, either intentionally = or=20 unconsciously. And contrary to modernist thinking, those relational = properties=20 are real, no less real than the numerical, spatial, physical or other = monadic=20 properties of the technological artifact. The reality of the properties = is such=20 that they "inhere" in the artifact as much as the property of mass = "inheres" in=20 a rock. To suggest that my oak bookshelf only has economic or aesthetic=20 properties when some person is engaged in economic transaction or = aesthetic=20 appreciation with the bookshelf as object is about as meaningful as = saying that=20 a rock has physical properties only when another physical body is within = range=20 of interacting with it. In one sense, of course, it is true. But that is = a very=20 abstract sense, very much detached from reality as it confronts us in = its=20 wholeness.

PART IV: THE BI-DIRECTIONAL CHARACTER OF TECHNOLOGICAL = ARTIFACTS

     Having argued that things = have=20 relational as well as monadic properties, that relational properties are = no less=20 "real" than monadic properties, and that technological artifacts have = relational=20 (as well as monadic) properties designed into them, it is here = appropriate to=20 state the central thesis of this paper: The relational properties of=20 technological artifacts are such that there is a symmetry to = human-artifact=20 relationships. Humans design relational properties into artifacts and = artifacts=20 lead humans to behave in accordance with those same properties.=20
     To say that humans design = relational=20 properties into technological artifacts is, of course, a truism. We = design=20 breakfast cereals to nourish us-a biotic property. We design = recliner-rockers to=20 be comfortable-a sensory property. We design rear spoilers on some = automobiles=20 to allude to high speed (even if they are completely non-functional = within the=20 operating speed range of the vehicle)-an aesthetic property. We design = consumer=20 products to sell for a particular price-an economic property. We design = assisted=20 living facilities to care for the elderly-an ethical property. These are = only=20 five of the many kinds of properties that we design into artifacts and = that=20 demonstrate the diversity in creation by virtue of being irreducible to = one=20 another or to more basic properties.
     A = less=20 well-accepted point and one made earlier in this paper is that these=20 properties-relational properties-are as fundamental to the nature of the = artifact as its physical or spatial properties. Consider the comfort = that is=20 designed into a particular recliner-rocker. To argue that its "real" = properties=20 are spatial and physical alone, and that comfort exists only as the = subjective=20 reaction of a particular person to those spatial and physical properties = is to=20 reduce the whole of the recliner-rocker to an abstraction. That = abstraction is a=20 short-lived necessity in the design computations of an engineer-a very=20 "stripped-down model" of the real recliner-rocker. The real = recliner-rocker sits=20 in the display window of a furniture store and is "tried out" by = prospective=20 buyers. Eventually it sits in your study, beneath the illumination = provided by a=20 lamp and within reach of a small table that supports your book and your = cup of=20 coffee. Its comfort is as real and inherent a property as is its weight = and the=20 floor space that it occupies.
     But there = is one=20 more point I wish to make. My thesis is that technological artifacts = have a=20 bi-directional character with respect to humans. Thus it is not enough = to say=20 that comfort is designed into your recliner-rocker in such a way that = inheres in=20 the very identity of the chair. For just as the designers and = fabricators gave=20 form to various elements of creation in order to bring your = recliner-rocker into=20 being, that recliner-rocker, by virtue of its properties, shapes your=20 environment and therefore your life. It leads you to behave in certain = ways and=20 not in other ways. For example, if the recliner-rocker has a particular=20 combination of comfort properties-extra soft and very easy to recline-it = may=20 lead you to nap in it more than you might plan, and your reading will = suffer. Or=20 if it has a swivel base, an insulated mug holder, and a pocket that = neatly holds=20 a remote control, you may be tempted to swivel around and, rather than = dive into=20 your paperback copy of The Brother Karamazov, yield to the = seductive call=20 of a televised Big Ten football game. But if the kind of comfort = properties are=20 such that the chair supports you in a good reading position and holds = you fast=20 beneath the light of your lamp, minimizing distractions from other parts = of the=20 room, then you will be encouraged to read and, more than likely, after a = few=20 years together you will have found that you accomplished more satisfying = reading=20 than if you had purchased a more plush, swivel model with an insulated = mug=20 holder and remote control pocket.
     My = experience=20 with college students is that they resist the notion that technological=20 artifacts might influence them. Some, but not all, do so on the basis of = an=20 unconscious commitment to naturalism. That is to say, they = subconsciously=20 denigrate relational properties to an ontological status below that of = monadic=20 properties, considering only the physical and spatial to be truly real. = Other=20 students may accept that relational properties are real and inherent in=20 technological artifacts. But a commitment to the belief in their own = individual=20 autonomy combined with a weak view of relational properties lead them to = think=20 that they, at least, would not allow themselves to be influenced. For = example,=20 they agree that the amount of horsepower designed into an automobile = would=20 certainly influence how they might pull out from an entry ramp onto a = busy=20 freeway. But they refuse to believe that the aesthetic properties of the = car=20 would have a similar effect.

PART V: CONCLUSIONS AND=20 APPLICATIONS

     If we recognize that=20 technological artifacts have a kind of symmetry to their relational = properties=20 such that not only do persons design properties into artifacts but those = same=20 properties lead persons to behave in particular ways, what ought to be = our=20 response? Certainly one response will be for designers to be more = sensitive to=20 the properties they design into artifacts. In a sense that is nothing = new.=20 Engineering design is very much the process of consciously creating = artifacts=20 with properties that enable persons to solve problems. But notice the = word=20 "consciously." I have argued that often the relational properties of = artifacts=20 are unconsciously designed into them. Consider the calculator. It = was=20 designed to facilitate the rapid processing of simple mathematical = calculations.=20 In addition to accomplishing that, however, it creates an environment = whereby=20 the user tends to transfer a narrow, specific, and justifiable trust in = the=20 functional reliability of the calculator to a broader and = non-justifiable trust=20 in the representational meaning of the calculation. In the days before = the=20 calculator, when the slide rule was in use, its properties required its = user to=20 estimate an answer in order to know where to place the decimal point. = Having to=20 make that estimation resulted in a healthy level of skepticism regarding = the=20 meaning of any particular computational result. The calculator, by = removing the=20 need to estimate, removes the healthy skepticism accompanying the = estimation,=20 and fosters an unwarranted level of credulity. But the peculiar = combination of=20 logical, semantic, and fiduciary properties of the calculator that give = rise to=20 this unwarranted level of credulity were not consciously part of the = design=20 objective. That combination of properties became apparent only after the = artifact was used for a period of time. If designers are going to become = sensitive to the need to analyze their designs for less-than-obvious = relational=20 properties, they will need to be trained to perform certain kinds of=20 philosophical analysis with the same level of care and skill as they = exhibit=20 when performing, for example, stress analysis, circuit analysis, = economic=20 analysis, or uncertainty analysis.
     Each = spring=20 I teach a course to senior engineering students entitled Technology = &=20 Society. Half the time in the course is spent on engineering ethics = and the=20 other half is spent on a Christian philosophy of technology. Although by = this=20 time in their college education the engineering students have outgrown = the=20 "two-cultures" prejudice they had when they arrived as freshman, and = have even=20 learned to enjoy philosophy, they still resist the notion that the = relational=20 properties of technological artifacts are so inherent in the nature of = the=20 artifact that even they personally might be influenced. The only = effective=20 method for disabusing them of their na=EFvet=E9 is to confront them with = a wealth of=20 examples and case studies. I conclude this paper with two such examples, = one=20 from transportation technology and the other from communication=20 technology.
     The Ethical Properties = of the=20 Automobile. The automobile makes an excellent case study because it = is so=20 ubiquitous to everyday life. Since its invention we have been familiar = with its=20 physical and kinematic properties-horsepower and speed. Increasingly we = have=20 become aware that the automobile has economic properties beyond that of = initial=20 price. Fuel economy, compactness of size, and the number of passengers = per=20 vehicle are first of all issues of resource stewardship-which is what = economics=20 is all about. And although we may not articulate as clearly or as = frequently,=20 most of us are existentially aware of the profound social properties of = the=20 automobile. Simply consider the role that it plays in adolescence=20 development.
     One property (or = combination of=20 properties) of the automobile of which we are all aware, but which, like = my=20 engineering seniors, we are reluctant to associate with the artifact, is = that=20 which gives rise to the phenomenon of "road rage." There are two = conditions that=20 must be met before road rage can occur. First there must be established = an=20 environment of competition whereby two or more persons are attempting to = achieve=20 an outcome that is possible for only one person. Second, that = environment must=20 also be such that the "other person" will be perceived in abstraction = rather=20 than in wholeness. For example, currently we know "the terrorists" not = as whole=20 persons, but as abstractions. An abstraction is not a person, but is = more akin=20 to a fly, or a sudden thunderstorm, or an accidental pounding of one's = thumb=20 with a hammer. Although we are created to love our neighbor, it is very=20 difficult to love an abstraction. Annoyance, and even hate, however, = seems=20 almost appropriate to a pesky fly or an errant swing of the hammer. In = other=20 words, when we reduce persons to abstractions it becomes difficult to = love them=20 and it becomes all too easy to hate = them.
     The=20 properties of an automobile are such that situations of competition = easily=20 arise. Unlike that of a railroad train or an airplane, the trip taken by = an=20 automobile may have an origin and a destination, but the pathway is = highly=20 contingent. This, along with the present reality that every car has a = driver,=20 sets up inevitable and numerous competitive situations. As two lanes = narrow to=20 one, the drivers of two cars, at one point parallel to each other in the = two=20 lanes, are placed in competition with each other with respect to = arriving at the=20 single lane first. In other situations, this competitive situation would = likely=20 not devolve into an analog of road range. For example, when two = pedestrians face=20 a similar situation, the competition will not be "who will get there = first"=20 (unless we are talking about 3rd graders lining up for lunch), but = rather, "who=20 will yield to the other first." The latter situation is conditioned by = love, and=20 that love is fostered by recognition of the other as a whole person. ut = the=20 properties of the automobile are such that it isolates drivers from = other=20 drivers. The other driver is thus not perceived as a whole person but = simply as=20 a "driver," an abstraction, almost akin to a mechanical part on the = other=20 automobile. The result is "road = rage."
     The very=20 nature of the automobile and the highway transportation system that has = evolved=20 in North America is such that these conditions are inevitable. To = eliminate road=20 rage as an inclination fostered by the properties of the automobile = would=20 require a paradigm shift in the North American perspective on = transportation=20 whereby the automobile would take a very distant "back seat" to mass=20 transportation systems like railroads, airplanes, and possibly busses. = But that=20 is unlikely to happen because two of the spirits that drive our North = American=20 society-individualism and technicism-have had a major role in the design = of our=20 transportation system. In fact, it can be argued that those spirits, as=20 "values," are designed into the automobile by virtue of the relational=20 properties that have been designed into it. Discounting the possibility = of a=20 paradigm shift away from the automobile, the only remaining response is = to warn=20 people that the properties of an automobile are such that a = propensity toward=20 road rage is designed into it and must be actively resisted by any = driver who=20 seeks to drive obediently before the face of God. In other words, = the=20 propensity toward road rage is an ethical property of the=20 automobile.
     The Economic Properties = of=20 Email. My final example is less easily defined and less well = developed due=20 to its still being novel to most of our experience. But that novelty = means that=20 it is less well established and therefore we are at a point where we = might yet=20 be able to thwart some of its most detrimental potential influences and=20 encourage those that may be most beneficial. Consider the specific = information=20 technology artifact that we call "email." Many of us share a sense that = this=20 powerful tool can be as much a curse as a blessing. But a "sense" that = is=20 neither articulated nor followed by careful analysis and communal = scholarship=20 will not protect us from the curse nor insure for us the blessing. What = are the=20 relational properties designed into the technological artifact we call = "email,"=20 and in what directions do those peculiar combinations of properties = drive us as=20 email users? One might attempt to answer that question by investigating = email's=20 sensory, rational, aesthetic, semantic, social, and legal properties. = Some work=20 in this direction, of an informal kind, has already been done.8 We=20 should also inquire into the ethical and fiduciary properties of email. = Any one=20 of these, however, being worthy of considerable study, would require at = least a=20 full paper itself just to introduce. Here I will only look at a narrow = range of=20 economic properties of email and suggest how those properties may be = directing=20 our lives.
When we raise questions of economics we are raising = questions=20 about the stewardship of resources-often scarce resources. When we solve = a=20 problem in economics we usually overcome the scarcity of a resource by = reducing=20 its scarcity (increasing its availability) or by finding a way to live=20 effectively with that scarcity (usually by substituting another, more = plentiful=20 resource to accomplish a task). With email, the original problem is the = scarcity=20 of means for communication. Letters require time to write, a writing = implement,=20 paper, and a postal system that can reliably deliver a letter in a = reasonable=20 amount of time and at a reasonable cost. The telephone requires you to=20 communicate in real time. That is, two people must simultaneously have = time=20 available to talk on the phone and the person placing the call must = first be in=20 a state of extemporaneous preparedness with respect both to what is to = be=20 communicated and a means for giving some kind of permanence to the = resulting=20 communication. There must also be available a telephone system that will = facilitate the call at a reasonable price. But it is the first two=20 constraints-the scarcity of simultaneous time and of "preparedness"-that = limit=20 the use of the telephone. Email functions economically by either = reducing or=20 eliminating these scarcity problems. It eliminates the need for = simultaneous=20 availability of time since an email may be sent at one point in time, is = almost=20 instantly delivered, yet may be read at a time convenient to the = receiver. It=20 provides preparedness in terms of permanence since both the sent email = and the=20 email response may be stored electronically. It eliminates the need for=20 extemporaneous preparedness on the part of the sender by not = constraining the=20 time to think about and write the email.
At first glance these = economic=20 properties seem very attractive and, of course, they are responsible for = the=20 rapid growth of email communication during the past decade. But how do = these=20 properties influence people? The obvious answer is that people will = communicate=20 more by using email than they would without its availability. Is that=20 beneficial? Well, yes, but only up to a point. Consider an older but = analogous=20 technological development: that of energy. It was during the Industrial=20 Revolution that a radical transformation in the source of energy took = place.=20 Prior to that time all energy was biotically derived (from human or = animal=20 muscles or from the combustion of plant materials) and was thus = relatively=20 scarce. After the Industrial Revolution, and particularly during the = latter half=20 of the twentieth century, energy became readily available thanks to the=20 discovery and development of fossil fuels. Was that availability = beneficial?=20 Certainly, but it has also resulted in at least two problems that were = not=20 foreseen until recently: pollution of the air and water with combustion = products=20 and climatic instabilities brought about by an increased concentration = of carbon=20 dioxide in the atmosphere. Another problem that would result if those = desiring=20 unlimited energy availability were to realize their dream of safe = nuclear fusion=20 reactors would be thermal pollution of the atmosphere with consequent=20 catastrophic climatic alterations. The properties of fossil fuels have=20 encouraged exponentially increasing desires for more energy and hence = the=20 burning of exponentially increasing amounts of fossil fuels. And now we = discover=20 that to be a problem. The analogy with email is that the properties of = email=20 encourage exponentially increasing amounts of communication via email. = The=20 problem is that we, much like the biosphere, are finite creatures. We = have a=20 limited capacity for communication-regardless of what technological = artifact we=20 may design to assist us. Yet we spend more and more time each day = reading and=20 responding to email messages. Eventually we reach a limit and begin = engaging in=20 "email triage." But the email continues to pour in, and much like the = Sorcerer's=20 Apprentice we panic, as we cannot hit the delete button fast enough and = we sink=20 beneath the waves of information.
The problem in both of these = examples is=20 that we are getting what we want, or to use an older turn of phrase, we = are=20 reaping what we sow. It is our antinormative seeking after individual = freedom=20 that determines the ethical properties of the modern automobile. And it = is that=20 same set of ethical properties that in turn lead us, as we drive our = cars, to=20 the ethically antinormative behavior of road rage. Likewise it is our = worship at=20 the altar of economism that drives us to blithely seek greater and = greater=20 efficiencies in our communication technology and to dismiss the notion = of a=20 limit to information, perhaps even a steady-state information economy = with the=20 same level of contempt we have for limiting our consumption of energy, = what some=20 have called a steady-state energy=20 economy.
     "Christian scholarship=85for = what?"=20 Well, to provide the philosophical tools to analyze technological = development at=20 an early stage-before artifacts become so entrenched that we need a = paradigm=20 shift, a revolution, to free ourselves from=20 them.

REFERENCES

Bratt, James D. (ed.), 1998, = Abraham=20 Kuyper: A centennial reader, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, = Grand=20 Rapids, MI.

Descartes, R., = 1968,=20 Discourse on Method and the Meditations, Penguin Books,=20 London.

Landauer, = Thomas K.,=20 1995, The Trouble with Computers: Usefulness, Usability, and=20 Productivity, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

Marshall, W.H., = 1963,=20 The Major English Romantic Poets, Washington Square Press, Inc., = New=20 York, NY.

Norman, Donald = A., 1992,=20 Turn Signals Are the Facial Expressions of Automobiles, = Addison-Wesley=20 Publishing Company, New York, NY.

__________, = 1998, The=20 Invisible Computer: Why Good Products Can Fail, The Personal Computer Is = So=20 Complex, and Information Appliances Are The Solution, The MIT Press, = Cambridge, MA.

Tenner, Edward, = 1996,=20 Why Things Bite Back: Technology and the Revenge of Unintended=20 Consequences, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, NY.

Endnotes =
1=20 Colossians 1:16 (NIV)
2 From = "Sphere=20 Sovereignty," quoted in Bratt (1988), p. 488.
3 = Colossians 1:16-17=20 (NIV)
4 See = throughout=20 Descartes' Discourse on Method.
5 This is = the broad,=20 colloquial understanding of the phrase "physical properties" that is = consistent=20 with the dualism and reductionism of naturalism. It immediately raises = the=20 question, however, of how numerical and geometrical properties (e.g., = the number=20 of quills and the length of each quill) can be reduced to the category = of the=20 physical (those dealing with matter and energy).
6 Or "rest = mass," or=20 "mass equivalency" in the sense of E =3D mc2.
7 = Wordsworth, The=20 Tables Turned, in Marshall, 1963, p. 129.
8 See, for = example,=20 Landauer (1995), Norman (1992 and 1998), and Tenner = (1996).